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Employer health insurance mandates form the basis of many health care reform proposals.  Proponents
make the case that they will increase insurance, while opponents raise the concern that low-wage workers
will see offsetting reductions in their wages and that in the presence of minimum wage laws some
of the lowest wage workers will become unemployed.  We construct an estimate of the number of
workers whose wages are so close to the minimum wage that they cannot be lowered to absorb the
cost of health insurance, using detailed data on wages, health insurance, and demographics from the
Current Population Survey.  We find that 33 percent of uninsured workers earn within $3 of the minimum
wage, putting them at risk of unemployment if their employers were required to offer insurance.  Assuming
an elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage increase of -0.10, we estimate that 0.2
percent of all full-time workers and 1.4 percent of uninsured full-time workers would lose their jobs
because of a health insurance mandate. Workers who would lose their jobs are disproportionately likely
to be high school dropouts, minority, and female.  This risk of unemployment should be a crucial component
in the evaluation of both the effectiveness and distributional implications of these policies relative
to alternatives such as tax credits, Medicaid expansions, and individual mandates, and their broader
effects on the well-being of low-wage workers.
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                Employer health insurance mandates form the basis of many health care reform 
proposals.  Democratic Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John Edwards and Barack 
Obama have all proposed reforms that include pay-or-play mandates.  Individual states 
are contemplating these mandates as well. In California, for example, the state legislature 
passed a law requiring employers above a certain size to provide a specified package of 
health benefits for their workers. California voters narrowly overturned the measure 
(“Proposition 72”) in 2004, but Governor Schwarzenegger recently unveiled a new plan 
to expand insurance coverage that requires employer contributions. Oregon and 
Washington enacted mandates that were later repealed. Hawaii implemented an employer 
mandate in 1974. The recent reform in Massachusetts, which combines an individual 
mandate, employer requirements, redirection of Medicaid funds, and the creation of a 
new insurance pooling mechanism, has garnered much attention and may spur similar 
reforms in other states. 
The proponents of these measures make the case that they will increase insurance 
coverage while maintaining the role of the market in generating competition and 
efficiency in health insurance offerings.  Opponents raise the concern that low-income 
workers will see offsetting reductions in their wages and that in the presence of minimum 
wage laws some of the lowest wage workers will become unemployed.  Academics and 
the popular press alike cite increased health insurance costs as one of the causes of recent 
increases in unemployment (Porter, 2004).  Estimates of the potential job loss from the 
mandates included in the failed Clinton health care proposal ranged from 600,000 to 
more than 2,000,000.  2 
  To determine how important the potential job loss from employer mandates is, we 
need to know how many workers are likely to be affected.  Several factors affect the 
degree to which employer mandates will cause unemployment.  First, what is the likely 
cost of the mandated health insurance?  This clearly depends on the specifics of the 
mandated coverage.
1  Second, how much of an increase in the cost of employing workers 
is borne by employees in the form of reduced wages?  There is substantial evidence that 
the cost of health insurance mandates will be shifted to employees, resulting in lower 
wages.
2  Third, how many workers not currently covered by employer-sponsored 
insurance are so close to the minimum wage that their wages cannot be lowered enough 
to offset the cost of the new mandate?  We focus on the last question. This paper provides 
an estimate of how big the pool of workers at risk of unemployment is likely to be and 
what characteristics they are likely to have, taking into account minimum wage laws and 
patterns of employer health insurance offering and coverage. 
  We construct an estimate of the number of workers whose wages are so low that 
they cannot be lowered to absorb the cost of health insurance, using detailed data on 
wages, health insurance, and demographics from the Current Population Survey.  We 
characterize the population of workers at risk in terms of their socio-demographic 
characteristics (age, race, gender, education, family structure), and industry of 
employment.  We find that 33 percent of uninsured workers earn within $3 of the 
                                                 
1 Yelowitz (“The Cost of California’s Health Insurance Act of 2003”, EPI, 2003), for example, shows that 
costs and benefits of California’s law depend crucially on the subsidy for low-income workers, the 
generosity of the plan required to fulfill the “play-or-pay” requirements, etc.  See also Zedlewski et al, 
“Play-or-Pay Employer Mandates:  Potential Effects”, Health Affairs, Spring 2002; and Krueger and 
Reinhardt, “The Economics of Employer Versus Individual Mandates”, Health Affairs, Spring 1994. 
2 See, for example, Jonathan Gruber and Alan Krueger, “The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided 
Insurance:  Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance,” Tax Policy and the Economy, 1991; and 
Norman Thurston, “Labor Market Effects of Hawaii’s Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October, 1997.  3 
minimum wage, putting them at substantial risk of unemployment if their employers were 
required to offer insurance.  These workers are disproportionately likely to be high school 
dropouts or racial minorities.  Understanding which workers these laws are likely to 
affect should play an important role in the assessment of the effect of employer mandates 
on the level and distribution of employment and insurance coverage.    
 
BACKGROUND 
The estimated impact of an employer health insurance mandate on insurance 
coverage and employment depends on two sets of factors: (1) the specifics of the mandate 
and (2) what one assumes about the dynamics of wages, fringe benefits, and employment. 
Specific mandate proposals vary widely from state to state.
3  Most include 
exemptions for smaller firms (e.g. those with fewer than 20 employees in California) and 
for employees with few hours (e.g. fewer than 20 hours per week in Hawaii or 100 hours 
per month in California).  Most include minimum employer contributions (such as 80 
percent of premiums in California or 75 percent for employees in Oregon) and minimum 
coverage requirements (benchmarked to other plans offered in the state in Hawaii; 
including prescription drugs and preventive care in California).  Three of these features 
are likely to be particularly important for the analysis of any particular mandate.  First, 
which employers and employees are affected?  Any exemptions, such as those for small 
firms or part-time workers, will dilute both the positive and negative effects of a mandate.  
Second, what is the marginal cost of the newly mandated benefits, both in terms of 
specific benefits and in terms of lost flexibility for employers?  A mandate can specify a 
                                                 
3 Yelowitz (2004) illustrates the importance of understanding the specifics of California’s proposed 
mandate in order to estimate the proposal’s cost.  4 
generous benefits package that all employers must provide (thus increasing costs for 
some employers already providing insurance) or it can require minimal coverage that 
affects only employers who do not already provide insurance. Third, what fraction of 
these costs must nominally be borne by the employer?  When nominal wage rigidities 
prevent accommodation of increased costs through reduced wages, the statutory 
incidence may have a substantial effect. Policies that require firms to offer insurance but 
not pay for it would like have little effect on rates of coverage because uninsured workers 
do not appear to be very responsive to the availability of benefits unless they are very 
heavily subsidized (Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin, 1997; for a review of the recent 
literature on price elasticities of demand for health insurance among uninsured workers, 
see Gruber and Washington, 2003).
4   
  The second set of issues – what assumptions one maintains about the dynamics of 
wages, fringe benefits, and employment – comes into play when a significant share of the 
cost of the newly mandated health benefits falls on employers.  There is a consensus 
among most economists that these costs, like the cost of any fringe benefit that workers 
value, will be passed on to workers in the form of reduced wages whenever possible (see 
Gruber and Krueger, 1991; Gruber, 1994; Fishback and Kantor, 1995; Olson, 2002).  The 
implication of this is that when an insurance mandate accomplishes its stated goal of 
extending coverage to a previously uninsured worker, that worker will also experience a 
reduction in her wage or the growth of her wage relative to what would have happened 
otherwise.  In the best-case scenario, the worker’s wage will be sufficiently high to 
                                                 
4 If workers are required to take up the insurance, the degree to which workers value the benefits and the 
elasticity of labor supply and demand  would determine the ultimate effect on wages (and the “incidence” 
of the mandate) – as discussed below.  See Summers (1989) for a discussion of how worker valuation 
affects the incidence of mandated benefits.  5 
absorb the entire cost of the benefit, and the mandate will have changed the composition 
of compensation (less wages, more benefits) but not the total value of compensation.  
The problem arises when the worker’s wage is not high enough to absorb this cost 
without bumping into the minimum wage.  When this is the case, the insurance mandate 
has the same effect on employment as an increase in the minimum wage.  Suppose, for 
example, that an uninsured worker earning the minimum wage becomes subject to an 
insurance mandate that requires the employer to provide benefits that cost $1 per hour 
worked.  Since there is no scope to reduce wages, the hourly cost of employing the 
worker is now the minimum wage plus $1.  Economists have long believed that this is 
likely to result in lower employment, as employers substitute machines for workers when 
workers become more expensive.  The size of this “elasticity” of employment with 
respect to the minimum wage has been the subject of considerable recent controversy:  
there is little consensus on the magnitude of the unemployment effect associated with an 
increase in the minimum wage (see Brown, 1999, for a review).  Regardless of one’s 
beliefs about the employment effect of minimum wage increases, however, the 
employment effect of an employer health insurance mandate that increases employer 
costs ought to be the same as the effect of a change in the minimum wage.  In the analysis 
that follows, we present estimates of the population at risk of being affected by the 
imposition of employer mandates, to which different estimates of the elasticity of 
employment with respect to changes in the minimum wage can be applied.  Our analysis 
shows how many uninsured workers are within different ranges of the minimum wage 
(such as within $3), so that readers can consider mandates that impose different levels of  6 
cost on employers and a range of estimates of the effect of changes in the minimum wage 
on employment. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
  The primary data for analysis come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
conducted annually by the Bureau of the Census.  The CPS collects information from 
about 50,000 households each month about household composition, socio-demographic 
characteristics, earnings, and employment in eight different monthly surveys over the 
course of sixteen months.  Each month’s survey provides detailed demographic data such 
as age, race, education, marital status, and family composition of respondents. The March 
survey in each year also collects information about health insurance coverage.  We 
combine these variables with information provided by respondents about their labor force 
status, whether or not they are paid hourly, usual hours worked, and wages in an exit 
(“outgoing rotation”) interview.
5  We use data from 2000 to 2006, the most recent CPS 
survey available.  We restrict our sample to respondents age 22 to 65. 
  To this data we add information on the minimum wage, which varies by state and 
over time (see Nelson, Nelson and Fizpatrick, and Fitzpatrick, various years, for details 
of state law changes, also shown in Appendix Table A1).  While the federal minimum 
wage was $5.15 throughout our study period, several states enacted minimum wages that 
were higher than the federal minimum, so workers and employers in these states faced a 
                                                 
5 We are able to match just over 70 percent of March respondents to their corresponding exit (“outgoing 
rotation”) interview.  Reasons for failing to find a respondents across months include household mobility, 
nonresponses, and noise in the identifiers.  There is also a known decline in match quality following the 
expansion of the CPS sample size in 2002 (driven in part by the way that household identifiers were 
assigned to the new sample).  We use the standard household and person identifiers to match across 
months, and then screen for match quality using respondent demographics (such as age and gender), based 
on methodology outlined in Madrian and Lefgren (2000).  About 5.1% of observed “matches” appear to be 
false, and these observations are dropped.  7 
higher minimum wage.  We then compare workers’ wages to the minimum wage in effect 
in January in their state and year (which corresponds best with the period from which 
respondents in the CPS report their wages).   
  We also use information on health insurance premiums by state, year, and policy 
type (family or single) collected by the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 1999 to 
2005.  We merge this data with the individual observations from the CPS for those years 
(using the previous year’s survey to most closely match the timing of the CPS 
questionnaire) to impute a health insurance premium for each observation, attributing 
family policy premiums to those with a spouse or children and single policy premiums to 
those without.
6  We deflate all dollar amounts to year 2006 dollars using the CPI. 
  Together, these data allow us to estimate both the likely effect of different 
employer mandates on wages and employment, as well as the distributional implications 
for workers with different characteristics.  In the analysis that follows, we aggregate data 
from the CPS across years, and report workers’ insurance status, wages relative to the 
minimum wage, and various demographic characteristics such as age, race, marital status, 
and education.  We use the weights provided in the CPS so that the numbers and 
proportions we report are representative of the full-time private sector workforce as a 
whole.  See the Appendix Tables that follow for more detail. 
 
RESULTS 
  We use these data to estimate which workers would be at risk of unemployment 
with the imposition of employer mandates.  We present data on the health insurance and 
                                                 
6 The health insurance questions in the March CPS refer to coverage in the previous calendar year.  Swartz 
(1986) presents evidence that people actually respond to these questions as if they were reporting their 
coverage at the time of the survey.  8 
wage distribution of all workers, as well as different demographic subgroups, focusing in 
particular on workers with wages close to the minimum wage since it is these workers 
whose wages may have the least flexibility to be lowered in response to mandates that 
make employing them more costly, and thus may be most likely to face adverse 
employment consequences.
7  We focus our analysis on workers employed more than 20 
hours per week, as those with fewer hours are likely to be exempt from employer 
mandates.
8  Much more detailed data are shown in the Appendix Tables that follow. 
 
Workers at Risk 
  More than 15 percent of private sector workers employed more than 20 hours a 
week (whom we call “full time”) are currently uninsured. Note that our estimate of 
uninsured workers includes those who decline insurance offered to them by their 
employers, but does not include workers who get insurance from a source other than their 
own employer.
9 
                                                 
7 While hourly workers may be more susceptible to binding minimum wages than salaried workers, 
minimum wage laws apply to almost all salaried workers as well. We impute an hourly wage for those 
workers on salary using the usual hours worked per week and weekly wages from the CPS.  Workers paid 
hourly are much more likely to be close to the minimum wage than those paid on salary, but we include 
both in our analysis.   
8 Many proposed mandates only apply to full-time workers.  Employers might thus have the incentive to 
substitute away from full-time employees towards part-time employees.   We ignore these dynamics.  We 
are also implicitly assuming here that wages adjust independently of whether workers would have taken up 
insurance or not – insofar as there is no mechanism for employers to know ahead of time (when offering a 
wage and insurance package) whether a worker is going to take up that coverage or not. 
9 Implicitly, we are assuming that the wages of workers who turned down have not already adjusted 
downward by the cost of the insurance that they declined.  Analysis of the February Contingent Work 
Supplements to the Current Population Survey in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 shows that about one-
quarter of uninsured workers were offered insurance.  We also assume that workers with coverage from 
another source, which is typically a spouse’s employer-sponsored policy, would not be affected by 
mandates.  9 
Table 1:  Insurance Status of Full-Time Private Sector Workers  
(Fraction of all full-time private sector workers shown) 
 Total 
Health insurance status   
  Own employer health insurance  0.660 
  Other health insurance  0.187 
 Uninsured  0.152 
Total 1.000 
  
Who are these uninsured workers?  They are more than three times as likely to be high-
school drop-outs as insured workers, and twice as likely to be from a minority racial or 
ethnic group.  They are 50 percent more likely to be under age 35 and to be unmarried.  
They are almost twice as likely to be single parents. 
 
Table 2:  Demographics of Insured and Uninsured Workers 
(Fraction of full-time private sector workers in each column falling into category) 
 All  Insured  Uninsured 
  
High-school  dropout  0.11 0.08 0.27 
Racial/ethnic  minority 0.30 0.26 0.52 
Under age 35  0.34  0.31  0.50 
Unmarried  0.38 0.34 0.57 
Single  parents  0.07 0.06 0.11 
 
Uninsured workers are thus demographically quite different from insured workers.   
Several of these characteristics make them economically vulnerable – and also make 
them the target population for policies intended to expand health insurance coverage. 
  Many of the employer mandates being considered by different states exempt 
small firms.  More than 55 percent of all uninsured workers are employed in firms with 
more than 25 employees (compared to more 80 percent of insured workers) – which  10 
means that they would be covered by many proposed mandates.
10  Of course, mandates 
that cover only firms above this size would have commensurately smaller effects both on 
insurance coverage and on the risk of decreasing employment than proposals without 
such limitations. 
Table 3:  Establishment Size and Insurance Status 
(Fraction of full-time private sector workers in each column falling into category) 
 All  Insured  Uninsured 
Establishment size:   
  1-9  0.13 0.10 0.27 
  10-24  0.11 0.09 0.17 
  25-99  0.15 0.15 0.17 
  100-499  0.16 0.17 0.12 
  500-999  0.06 0.07 0.04 
  1,000+  0.39 0.42 0.23 
Total  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
     
Benchmark Insurance Costs 
  How likely these uninsured workers are to face unemployment depends on 
whether the minimum wage is binding – that is, if the hourly cost per worker of newly 
mandated health insurance is greater than the gap between the worker’s wage and the 
minimum wage.  While a more detailed calculation requires knowledge of (or 
assumptions about) workers’ family structure, health status, the elasticity of labor supply 
and demand, workers’ valuation of health insurance benefits, long-run labor market 
dynamics (such as substitution towards part-time employees) and the like, we calculate 
several informative back-of-the-envelope benchmarks using aggregate insurance costs.  
The average annual premium for employer-sponsored health insurance in our data was 
approximately $9,046 for family coverage and $3,429 for single coverage (for the period 
                                                 
10 It is not clear how accurate employees’ reports of their establishment size are.  11 
2000-2006, expressed in 2006 dollars), for an average hourly premium of $3.66 for a full-
time worker.
11 If employers were required to pay 80% of premiums, the average hourly 
wage for this group of workers would thus have to decrease by about $3 to absorb fully 
the cost of providing the average health insurance package.  Here, clearly, the costs 
would be different if the mandated insurance coverage were more or less generous than 
the typical plan already provided to most workers or if workers were required to pay 
more of the premium directly.   
  We also calculate a more sophisticated benchmark based on the insurance cost 
facing individual workers, rather than a broad average.  We impute the insurance cost for 
each worker based on state of residence, year, and family structure, divide that number by 
2,000 to generate an average hourly cost of insurance, and compare the difference 
between hourly wages and the minimum wage to that hourly insurance cost.   
Table 4: Health Insurance Premiums 
 Mean  Median  Min. Max. 
Average annual premiums         
  Single  coverage  $3,429 $3,480 $2,407 $5,088 
  Family  coverage  $9,046 $9,182 $6,078  $12,121 
      
Average hourly premium (overall)  $3.66  $4.01  $1.20  $6.06 
 
 
The Role of the Minimum Wage 
  A large fraction of uninsured workers earn little more than the minimum wage.  
Insurance costs potentially represent an enormous increase in the minimum compensation 
for this group of workers.  The federal minimum wage is $5.15, and the average 
                                                 
11 These data are consistent with other survey results on insurance costs, suggesting that our algorithm for 
assigning premiums in our sample is representative.  For example, the Kaiser/HRET survey reported 
average employer premiums in 2006 of $11,500 for family policies and $4,200 for single policies, while in 
our CPS/MEPS sample the average premium in 2006 was $10,700 for family policies and 4,000 for single 
policies.  12 
minimum wage in our sample (taking into account state minimums that are sometimes 
higher) is $5.98 – so the benchmark cost of $3 represents 50 percent of the effective 
minimum wage.
12  There is clearly a great deal of disagreement about the effect of 
minimum wages on employment, but even under relatively conservative elasticity 
estimates this could result in significant effects on minimum wage workers.   
Uninsured workers earning within $3 of the minimum wage represent 5 percent of 
the workforce, and a third of all uninsured workers.  (Using the more sophisticated 
benchmark based on individual insurance costs yields answers very similar to the $3 
benchmark, both of which are reported in the Appendix Tables.) 
Table 5:  Insurance Status and Wages  
for Full-Time Private Sector Workers 
Fraction of workers with:   
  Own employer health insurance  0.66 
  Other health insurance  0.19 
  No insurance and wages:   
  Within $1 minimum wage  0.02 
  Within $1.01 - $2 of minimum wage  0.01 
  Within $2.01 - $3 of minimum wage  0.02 
  More than $3 above minimum wage  0.10 
 
Figure 1 shows a more detailed distribution of the hourly wages of uninsured workers 
relative to the minimum wage. 
 
                                                 
12On average, wages represent about 70 percent of compensation in the private sector, with health insurance 
costs accounting for an addition 7 percent, other voluntary fringe benefits accounting for 14 percent, and 
legally required benefits (such as Social Security) accounting for the remaining 9 percent (Department of 
Labor 2007). In theory, then, employers might respond to insurance mandates by reducing other fringe 
benefits.  Low-wage workers are less likely than the typical worker to have these other benefits, however 
(Schwabisch 2004), so it is unclear in practice how much of a buffer other benefits provide.   13 
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  Thus, while the overall fraction of private sector workers who are “at risk” is 
moderate, since only 5 percent of all workers are uninsured workers earning within $3 of 
the minimum wage, a potentially very large fraction of the group supposedly targeted for 
help by employer mandates might in fact be hurt, since 33 percent of uninsured workers 
earn within $3 of the minimum wage.  So, of the roughly 114 million U.S. private sector 
workers, 105 million of whom work more than 20 hours per week, 16 million are 
uninsured, and more than 5 million of those earn within $3 of the minimum wage.
13 
  As Table 2 suggested, low-skilled workers are more likely to be uninsured.   
Figure 2 shows this wage distribution for workers with different levels of education.  
Workers with less than a high school degree are significantly more likely to have 
earnings close to the minimum wage. 
                                                 
13 Bureau of Labor Statistics series CES0500000001 (total private employment) is 113,753,000 in March 
2006 and about 114 million in other months of 2006 also. 
  14 
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Thus, among the uninsured, those with the least education face the highest risk of losing 
their jobs under employer mandates.  The same is true for nonwhites, those under age 35, 
single parents, and women (as seen in Appendix Table A4). 
 
Potential Job Loss  
 
How many of those workers are likely to lose their jobs?  We calculate an 
approximate answer to this question in the following way.  First, we compare the 
individual-specific hourly insurance costs described above to the cushion between an 
uninsured worker’s wage and the minimum wage.  If a worker’s wage is sufficiently high 
that it can adjust downward by the full cost of insurance without hitting the minimum 
wage, we assume this worker is not at risk of losing her job.  If, however, the minimum 
wage constraint binds, we calculate the percentage increase in total compensation implied  15 
by the health insurance mandate.  For example, if a worker earning $6 per hour is 
mandated to have health insurance costing the firm $2 per hour, we assume that her wage 
will adjust downward by 85 cents to the minimum wage of $5.15.  However, the 
remaining $1.15 of the cost of the mandate cannot be absorbed by reducing wages and 
increases her total compensation to $7.15 – an increase in compensation of almost 20 
percent ($1.15/$6.00 = 0.19). Assuming an employment elasticity with respect to the 
minimum wage of -0.1, meaning that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage would 
lead to a one percent reduction in employment, this worker has a two percent chance of 
losing her job.
14  Performing a similar calculation for all the workers in our sample 
suggests that about 224,000 workers would lose jobs as a result of a mandate with these 
costs.   More than 60 percent of these workers would be racial or ethnic minorities and 
about one-third would have less than a high school education.  The burden of the mandate 
would thus fall disproportionately on these groups since, for example, racial and ethnic 
minorities are only 30 percent of the workforce in this sample. 
Table 6:  Number of Workers at Risk of Losing Employment 
 
Total private sector workers (2006; from BLS)  114 million
Fraction of those workers who work full-time (more than 20 hours 
per week) (author calculations) 
91.4%
Total full-time private sector workers   104.2 million
Fraction of those who are uninsured   15.2%
Fraction “at risk” (uninsured and earning wages less than the  
minimum wage plus the cost of health insurance) 
5.3%
Workers at risk of losing employment  5.5 million
Average increase in compensation for uninsured “at risk” workers  40.6%
Workers likely to become unemployed assuming elasticity = -0.1  224,284
      Racial and ethnic minorities  136,342
      Workers with less education than high school degree  87,403
 
                                                 
14  This is a relatively conservative estimate of the sensitivity of employment to minimum wage laws.  See 
Brown (1999) for a review of the wider range of estimates of this elasticity.  16 
To the extent that mandates impose additional costs on firms (such as reduced 
flexibility or more generous coverage than they were already offering), these figures 
represent a lower bound on the increase in unemployment likely to result from such 
mandates.  As noted above, if mandates apply only to some workers this will dilute both 
the positive and negative effects of a mandate.  For example, establishments with fewer 
than 25 workers employ 44 percent of uninsured workers (Table 3); if these small 
employers were exempted from a mandate, our estimate of job loss would drop to about 
45 percent of the number above. 
 
Regional Variation 
  These results are not confined to any particular area of the country.  As Appendix 
Table 7 shows, the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West have very similar fractions of 
workers at risk for unemployment.  Looking at individual states shows that there is local 
variation in this at-risk pool, however (although sample size limits our ability to compare 
individual states). 
Table 7:  Workers at Risk by State 
 
  CA MA OR WA US  Avg
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000
Own employer health insurance  0.629 0.669 0.687 0.701  0.660
Other health insurance  0.176 0.233 0.162 0.152  0.187
Unins., within $1 min  0.052 0.012 0.045 0.040  0.022
Unins., $1-2 of min wage  0.022 0.009 0.020 0.017  0.012
Unins., $2-3 of min wage  0.018 0.006 0.017 0.014  0.016
Unins., $3+ min wage  0.104 0.071 0.070 0.077  0.103
 
Individual states should be more concerned with employment effects of their own 
minimum wage laws and health insurance mandates than the federal government, since  17 




  Understanding the labor market consequences of employer mandates is a key 
component in evaluating their effectiveness relative to other policies such as tax credits, 
Medicaid expansions, and individual mandates.  Several studies have analyzed the effect 
of different versions of employer mandates on insurance premiums and on workers’ 
wages.  This study contributes an important missing piece to the analysis: how large is 
the potential risk of unemployment?  Our analysis suggests that one third of the targeted 
population of uninsured workers have hourly wages close enough to the minimum wage 
that employers will not be able to lower their wages enough to accommodate fully the 
increase in compensation costs that employer mandates would impose.  These workers, 
who tend to be disproportionately low-education, minority, and female, thus face a risk of 
unemployment.  This risk of unemployment should be a crucial component in the 
evaluation of both the effectiveness of these policies in reducing the number of uninsured 
and their broader effects on the well-being of low-wage workers.   18 
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Table A1 
State Minimum Wage Laws in Effect by Year (in January) 
 
State  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
AL  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
AK  $7.15 $7.15 $7.15 $7.15 $5.65 $5.65 $5.65 
AZ  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
AR  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
CA  $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.25 $5.75 
CO  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
CT  $7.40 $7.10 $7.10 $6.90 $6.70 $6.40 $5.65 
DE  $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $5.65 
DC  $7.00 $6.60 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 
FL  $6.40 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
GA  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
HI  $6.75 $6.25 $6.25 $6.25 $5.75 $5.25 $5.25 
ID  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
IL  $6.50 $6.50 $5.40 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
IN  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
IA  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
KS  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
KY  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
LA  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
ME  $6.35 $6.35 $6.25 $6.25 $5.75 $5.15 $5.15 
MD  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
MA  $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.75 $6.00 
MI  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
MN  $6.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
MS  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
MO  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
MT  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NE  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NV  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NH  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NJ  $6.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NM  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NY  $6.00 $6.00 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
NC  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
ND  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
OH  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
OK  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
OR  $7.50 $7.25 $7.05 $6.90 $6.50 $6.50 $6.50 
PA  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
RI  $6.75 $6.75 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $6.15 $5.65 
SC  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
SD  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
TN  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
TX  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
UT  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
VT  $7.25 $7.00 $6.75 $6.25 $6.25 $6.25 $5.75 
VA  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
WA  $7.35 $7.35 $7.16 $7.01 $6.90 $6.72 $6.50 
WV  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
WI  $5.70 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
WY  $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 
Federal $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.15  22 
Table A2 
Demographic and employment characteristics for full-time private sector workers with and 
without insurance (each entry represents fraction of total full-time private sector workforce) 
 All  Insured  Unins. 
Age:  
  22 – 24  0.071 0.058  0.145
  25 – 34  0.271 0.255  0.359
  35 – 44  0.294 0.300  0.261
  45 – 54  0.248 0.263  0.164
  55 – 64  0.116 0.124  0.071
Family  structure:     
  Single male, no kids  0.171 0.148  0.300
  Married male, no kids  0.151 0.159  0.107
  Single male, kids  0.016 0.014  0.026
  Married male, kids  0.218 0.226  0.176
  Single female, no kids  0.136 0.131  0.161
  Married female, no kids  0.125 0.133  0.077
  Single female, kids  0.055 0.051  0.079
  Married female, kids  0.128 0.138  0.074
Education:     
  Less than 9 years  0.024 0.013  0.085
  9 – 11 years  0.081 0.062  0.186
 High  school  graduate  0.325 0.316  0.379
 Some  college  0.291 0.301  0.232
 College  graduate  0.201 0.220  0.098
 Post-college  0.078 0.088  0.021
Race:     
 White  non-Hispanic  0.702 0.741 0.482
 Black  non-Hispanic  0.104 0.099 0.132
  Hispanic (any race)  0.136 0.102 0.325
 Other  non-Hispanic  0.058 0.057 0.061
Establishment  size:     
  1 – 9  0.129 0.104  0.271
  10 – 24  0.106 0.094  0.173
  25 – 99  0.154 0.151  0.167
  100 – 499  0.160 0.166  0.121
  500 – 999  0.062 0.066  0.040
 1,000+  0.389 0.418  0.228
Industry     
 Agriculture,  mining,  construction  0.088 0.074  0.170
 Manufacturing  0.196 0.208  0.129
 Trade  0.183 0.177  0.216
  Transportation, communications, utilities  0.067 0.070  0.053
 Financial  services,  insurance, real estate  0.084 0.091  0.042
 Services  0.382 0.381  0.391
     
Unweighted sample size  235,034 202,037  32,99723 
Table A3 
Distribution of all full-time private sector workers  
by insurance coverage and wage relative to minimum if uninsured  
 
  Fraction of workers with 
 















$1.01 - $2 
 
$2.01 - $3 
 
>$3 
Total 0.660  0.187 0.153 0.022  0.012  0.016  0.103
Age:           
 22  –  24  0.466  0.223 0.311 0.057  0.031  0.043  0.179
 25  –  34  0.633  0.165 0.202 0.029  0.016  0.021  0.136
 35  –  44  0.670  0.195 0.135 0.017  0.010  0.013  0.095
 45  –  54  0.702  0.197 0.101 0.013  0.008  0.010  0.070
 55  –  64  0.729  0.177 0.094 0.013  0.008  0.009  0.064
Family  structure:           
  Single male, no kids  0.651  0.083 0.267 0.033  0.019  0.026  0.188
 Married  male,  no  kids  0.735  0.157 0.108 0.011  0.006  0.009  0.081
  Single male, kids  0.668  0.081 0.251 0.023  0.015  0.025  0.188
 Married  male,  kids  0.706  0.171 0.123 0.013  0.008  0.010  0.092
  Single female, no kids  0.725  0.094 0.181 0.035  0.018  0.022  0.106
  Married female, no kids  0.599  0.306 0.094 0.013  0.009  0.011  0.062
  Single female, kids  0.622  0.159 0.219 0.043  0.024  0.030  0.123
  Married female, kids  0.513  0.400 0.088 0.019  0.010  0.010  0.049
Education:           
  Less than 9 years  0.326  0.141 0.534 0.145 0.069  0.062  0.258
  9 – 11 years  0.473  0.176 0.350 0.068  0.040  0.048  0.194
 High  school  graduate  0.630  0.193 0.178 0.022  0.015  0.019  0.122
 Some  college  0.675  0.203 0.122 0.014  0.007  0.011  0.089
 College  graduate  0.749  0.177 0.074 0.006 0.003  0.004  0.061
 Post-college  0.801  0.158 0.041 0.002  0.001  0.002  0.036
Race:           
 White  non-Hispanic  0.698  0.198 0.105 0.012  0.007  0.009  0.078
 Black  non-Hispanic  0.645  0.162 0.193 0.023  0.016  0.025  0.130
  Hispanic (any race)  0.646  0.192 0.161 0.025 0.014  0.013  0.110
 Other  non-Hispanic  0.485  0.152 0.364 0.072  0.040  0.044  0.208
Establishment  size:           
  1 – 9  0.360  0.320 0.320 0.049  0.025  0.029  0.217
 10  –  24  0.499  0.252 0.249 0.035  0.019  0.026  0.168
 25  –  99  0.635  0.199 0.166 0.024  0.014  0.018  0.110
 100  –  499  0.722  0.163 0.115 0.016  0.008  0.013  0.079
 500  –  999  0.755  0.147 0.097 0.012  0.008  0.010  0.068
 1,000+  0.773  0.138 0.089 0.012  0.009  0.010  0.059
    24 
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Uninsured  ≤$1  $1.01 - $2  $2.01 - $3  >$3 
           
           
Industry    
Agriculture, mining, 
construction 0.537  0.170 0.293 0.027 0.015  0.021 0.230 
Manufacturing 0.780  0.120 0.101 0.011 0.008  0.011 0.070 
Trade 0.612  0.208 0.180 0.033 0.019  0.021 0.107 
Transportation, 
communications, 
utilities 0.744  0.136 0.121 0.009 0.006  0.010 0.097 
Financial services, 
insurance, real estate  0.730  0.195 0.076 0.005 0.003  0.006 0.061 
Services 0.621  0.224 0.156 0.027 0.014  0.018 0.098 
    
Unweighted sample size  156,280  45,757 32,997 4,490 2,604  3,412 22,491 
 25 
Table A4 
Cumulative fraction of uninsured full-time private sector workers within a certain amount of minimum wage 
 
 
  Gap between worker’s wage and the minimum wage 
      $0.25 $0.5 $0.75 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00  $2.50 $3.00 $3.50 $4.00 >$4.00
   
Total 0.075 0.095 0.110 0.142 0.180 0.224  0.275 0.327 0.391 0.439 1.000
A g e :              
 22  –  24  0.096 0.123 0.141 0.184 0.230 0.283  0.349 0.422 0.509 0.564 1.000
 25  –  34  0.077 0.096 0.112 0.143 0.180 0.224  0.276 0.325 0.389 0.439 1.000
 35  –  44  0.067 0.083 0.097 0.127 0.159 0.200  0.248 0.295 0.354 0.395 1.000
 45  –  54  0.064 0.079 0.094 0.126 0.165 0.207  0.251 0.302 0.358 0.402 1.000
 55  –  64  0.079 0.104 0.115 0.143 0.185 0.227  0.272 0.318 0.375 0.425 1.000
Family  structure:             
  Single male, no kids  0.067 0.085 0.098 0.125 0.157 0.196  0.243 0.295 0.361 0.411 1.000
 Married  male,  no  kids  0.058 0.072 0.083 0.105 0.133 0.165  0.205 0.248 0.303 0.343 1.000
  Single male, kids  0.039 0.053 0.062 0.092 0.122 0.151  0.205 0.251 0.302 0.358 1.000
 Married  male,  kids  0.044 0.066 0.078 0.105 0.139 0.172  0.212 0.253 0.315 0.356 1.000
  Single female, no kids  0.111 0.133 0.153 0.193 0.238 0.294  0.355 0.414 0.479 0.527 1.000
  Married female, no kids  0.072 0.085 0.101 0.135 0.177 0.229  0.284 0.346 0.405 0.460 1.000
  Single female, kids  0.108 0.132 0.153 0.194 0.239 0.302  0.372 0.440 0.516 0.575 1.000
  Married female, kids  0.107 0.134 0.156 0.213 0.267 0.326  0.389 0.444 0.513 0.555 1.000
Education:             
  Less than 9 years  0.150 0.189 0.217 0.271 0.340 0.400 0.455 0.516 0.608 0.656 1.000
  9 – 11 years  0.093 0.126 0.147 0.195 0.247 0.310  0.381 0.446 0.525 0.577 1.000
 High  school  graduate  0.064 0.080 0.094 0.123 0.159 0.205  0.259 0.313 0.377 0.427 1.000
 Some  college  0.067 0.080 0.092 0.119 0.146 0.180  0.222 0.269 0.326 0.376 1.000
 College  graduate  0.046 0.054 0.061 0.077 0.094 0.113  0.137 0.170 0.207 0.240 1.000
 Post-college  0.037 0.041 0.047 0.057 0.070 0.083  0.102 0.125 0.141 0.154 1.00026 
 
(Continued)  
    Within $X of minimum:  $0.25 $0.5 $0.75 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00  $2.50 $3.00 $3.50 $4.00 >$4.00
             
Race:             
 White  non-Hispanic  0.061 0.072 0.084 0.110 0.136 0.171  0.216 0.259 0.313 0.358 1.000
 Black  non-Hispanic  0.054 0.067 0.079 0.116 0.151 0.200  0.264 0.327 0.401 0.458 1.000
  Hispanic (any race)  0.085 0.106 0.124 0.154 0.196 0.239 0.272 0.319 0.369 0.409 1.000
 Other  non-Hispanic  0.102 0.137 0.158 0.199 0.253 0.308  0.366 0.429 0.506 0.557 1.000
Establishment  size:             
  1 – 9  0.090 0.108 0.123 0.153 0.187 0.230  0.274 0.321 0.377 0.425 1.000
 10  –  24  0.075 0.094 0.107 0.141 0.175 0.217  0.267 0.323 0.391 0.441 1.000
 25  –  99  0.073 0.094 0.111 0.144 0.186 0.228  0.280 0.335 0.402 0.450 1.000
 100  –  499  0.063 0.089 0.106 0.139 0.172 0.206  0.262 0.315 0.381 0.428 1.000
 500  –  999  0.069 0.082 0.093 0.119 0.155 0.204  0.250 0.306 0.383 0.441 1.000
 1,000+  0.066 0.084 0.100 0.134 0.177 0.230  0.288 0.341 0.405 0.451 1.000
Industry             
Agriculture, mining, 
construction 0.045 0.060 0.070 0.094 0.116 0.144  0.176 0.216 0.277 0.320 1.000
Manufacturing 0.050 0.072 0.088 0.111 0.148 0.194  0.247 0.302 0.370 0.418 1.000
Trade 0.093 0.119 0.141 0.181 0.232 0.287  0.347 0.406 0.473 0.525 1.000
Transportation, 
communications, utilities  0.036 0.045 0.053 0.071 0.095 0.120 0.155 0.200 0.234 0.274 1.000
Financial services, 
insurance, real estate  0.040 0.041 0.048 0.065 0.078 0.109  0.147 0.195 0.233 0.275 1.000











Proximity to minimum wage 
to qualify as “at risk” for an 
uninsured worker:  $1 $2 $3
Individual-
specific 




   
Total 0.022 0.034 0.05 0.053  0.142  0.223 0.327 0.348
A g e :           
 22  –  24  0.057 0.088 0.131 0.112  0.184  0.283 0.422 0.36
 25  –  34  0.029 0.045 0.066 0.072  0.143  0.224 0.325 0.355
 35  –  44  0.017 0.027 0.04 0.047  0.127  0.2 0.294 0.345
 45  –  54  0.013 0.021 0.03 0.033  0.126  0.207 0.302 0.327
 55  –  64  0.013 0.021 0.03 0.033  0.143  0.227 0.318 0.351
Family  structure:          
  Single male, no kids  0.033 0.052 0.079 0.046  0.125  0.196 0.295 0.173
 Married  male,  no  kids  0.011 0.018 0.027 0.042  0.105  0.165 0.248 0.387
  Single male, kids  0.023 0.038 0.063 0.107  0.092  0.151 0.251 0.426
 Married  male,  kids  0.013 0.021 0.031 0.049  0.105  0.171 0.253 0.398
  Single female, no kids  0.035 0.053 0.075 0.048  0.193  0.294 0.414 0.263
  Married female, no kids  0.013 0.022 0.033 0.047  0.135  0.229 0.346 0.502
  Single female, kids  0.043 0.066 0.096 0.134  0.194  0.302 0.44 0.61
  Married female, kids  0.019 0.028 0.039 0.053  0.213  0.325 0.444 0.603
Education:          
  Less than 9 years  0.145 0.213 0.276 0.312  0.271  0.4 0.516 0.584
  9 – 11 years  0.068 0.108 0.156 0.168  0.195  0.31 0.446 0.481
 High  school  graduate  0.022 0.036 0.056 0.059  0.123  0.205 0.313 0.331
 Some  college  0.014 0.022 0.033 0.033  0.119  0.179 0.269 0.274
 College  graduate  0.006 0.008 0.013 0.013  0.077  0.113 0.17 0.177
 Post-college  0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005  0.057  0.083 0.125 0.13228 
 







Proximity to minimum wage 
to qualify as “at risk” for an 
uninsured worker:  $1 $2 $3
Individual-
specific 




Race:          
 White  non-Hispanic  0.011 0.018 0.027 0.028  0.109  0.171 0.259 0.266
 Black  non-Hispanic  0.022 0.039 0.063 0.063  0.116  0.2 0.327 0.327
  Hispanic (any race)  0.025 0.039 0.051 0.055 0.154 0.239 0.319 0.342
 Other  non-Hispanic  0.072 0.112 0.156 0.175  0.199  0.308 0.429 0.48
Establishment  size:         
  1 – 9  0.049 0.074 0.103 0.112  0.153  0.23 0.321 0.351
 10  –  24  0.035 0.054 0.08 0.086  0.141  0.217 0.323 0.347
 25  –  99  0.024 0.038 0.056 0.059  0.144  0.228 0.335 0.357
 100  –  499  0.016 0.024 0.036 0.04  0.139  0.206 0.315 0.343
 500  –  999  0.012 0.02 0.03 0.034  0.119  0.204 0.306 0.347
 1,000+  0.012 0.021 0.03 0.031  0.134  0.23 0.341 0.343
Industry          
Agriculture, mining, 
construction 0.027 0.042 0.063 0.076  0.094  0.144 0.216 0.258
Manufacturing 0.011 0.019 0.03 0.033  0.111  0.194 0.302 0.328
Trade 0.033 0.052 0.073 0.073  0.181  0.287 0.406 0.406
Transportation, 
communications, utilities  0.009 0.014 0.024 0.025  0.071  0.12 0.2 0.209
Financial services, 
insurance, real estate  0.005 0.008 0.015 0.015  0.065  0.109 0.195 0.196
Services 0.026 0.04 0.058 0.062  0.17  0.259 0.371 0.398
   
Unweighted sample size  235,020 235,020 235,020 235,020  32,996  32,996 32,996 32,996
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Table A6 
Projected impact of insurance mandate on different groups 
 
 Fraction  of 
workers in this 








workers in this 
group losing jobs 
Fraction of all 
FT workers in 
this group losing 
jobs 
     
Total: 0.152 0.143 0.014  0.002 
Age:        
 22  –  24  0.311 0.153 0.018  0.006 
 25  –  34  0.202 0.146 0.013  0.003 
 35  –  44  0.135 0.139 0.013  0.002 
 45  –  54  0.101 0.135 0.014  0.001 
 55  –  64  0.094 0.143 0.017  0.002 
Family structure:         
  Single male, no kids  0.267 0.066 0.007  0.002 
 Married  male,  no  kids  0.108 0.151 0.017  0.002 
  Single male, kids  0.251 0.155 0.009  0.002 
 Married  male,  kids  0.123 0.134 0.013  0.002 
  Single female, no kids  0.181 0.111 0.014  0.002 
  Married female, no kids  0.094 0.228 0.019  0.002 
  Single female, kids  0.219 0.294 0.029  0.006 
  Married female, kids  0.087 0.283 0.024  0.002 
Education:       
  Less than 9 years  0.534 0.246 0.021  0.011 
  9 – 11 years  0.350 0.185 0.020  0.007 
 High  school  graduate  0.178 0.134 0.013  0.002 
 Some  college  0.121 0.122 0.013  0.002 
 College  graduate  0.074 0.077 0.007  0.001 
 Post-college  0.041 0.073 0.013  0.001 
Race:        
 White  non-Hispanic  0.105 0.118 0.012  0.001 
 Black  non-Hispanic  0.193 0.113 0.012  0.002 
  Hispanic (any race)  0.161 0.168 0.018  0.003 
 Other  non-Hispanic  0.364 0.187 0.019  0.007 
Establishment size:         
  1 – 9  0.320 0.159 0.016  0.005 
 10  –  24  0.249 0.139 0.012  0.003 
 25  –  99  0.166 0.135 0.012  0.002 
 100  –  499  0.115 0.131 0.012  0.001 
 500  –  999  0.097 0.133 0.019  0.002 
 1,000+  0.089 0.142 0.016  0.001 
Industry        
Agriculture, mining, 
construction 0.293 0.083 0.008  0.002 
Manufacturing 0.101 0.100 0.010  0.001 
Trade 0.180 0.158 0.015  0.003 
Transportation, 
communications, 
utilities 0.121 0.079 0.010  0.001 
Financial services, 
insurance, real estate  0.076 0.067 0.011  0.001 
Services 0.156 0.192 0.019  0.003 
   
Unweighted sample size  235,034 32,998 32,998  235,034 30 
Table A7 
Distribution of full-time private sector workers by insurance coverage and (if uninsured) wage 
relative to the minimum wage, for regions and selected states 
 
 
Northeast Midwest South West  Total
  
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000
Own EHI  0.669 0.691 0.645  0.643  0.660
Other EHI  0.202 0.203 0.175  0.177  0.187
Uninsured, within $1 of min wage  0.016 0.011 0.021  0.039  0.022
Uninsured, $1-2 of min wage  0.008 0.007 0.015  0.018  0.012
Uninsured, $2-3 of min wage  0.012 0.010 0.021  0.017  0.016
Uninsured, $3+ min wage  0.094 0.078 0.123  0.105  0.103
    
Unweighted sample size  51,321 61,393 67,705  54,615  235,034
 
 
CA MA OR WA 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
Own EHI  0.629 0.669 0.687  0.701 
Other EHI  0.176 0.234 0.162  0.152 
Uninsured, within $1 min  0.052 0.012 0.045  0.040 
Uninsured, $1-2 of min wage  0.022 0.009 0.020  0.017 
Uninsured, $2-3 of min wage  0.018 0.006 0.017  0.014 
Uninsured, $3+ min wage  0.104 0.071 0.070  0.077 
     
Unweighted sample size  16,990 4,905 3,216  3,925 
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Table A8 
Description of final sample selection 
 
 
   
All observations present in both March and “outgoing rotation group” 
CPS samples 
563,581 
Restrict to ages 22-64  493,539 
Restrict to workers  376,931 
Restrict to private sector  271,513 
Restrict to those working ≥ 20 hours/week   239,883 
Restrict to those with observed establishment size  235,836 
Restrict to those with observed wages and pay periods  235,677 
Restrict to those with valid industry, other than Public Administration  235,486 
Restrict to those with hourly earnings ≥ $1  235,034 
 
 
 
 